



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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AN: 0730002-0226

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ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 EA-11 ADP-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03

INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00

USIA-15 SY-10 USSS-00 OMS-01 RSR-01 IO-13 NIC-01 143 W

118714

R 021005Z JUL 73

FM AMEMBASSY KABUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4523

INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

AMEMBASSY KATMANDU

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

AMEMBASSY LONDON

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/LR

REVIEWED by

DATE

() RELEASE

() DECLASSIFY

() EXTEND

() DECLASSIFY IN PART

() DATE

() Non-proprietary info.

FOR TO CIA MEMPHIS

() CLASSIFY TO: () C, OADR

() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C, OADR

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PDNR, AF, CH, OR

SUBJ: VIEWS OF

REF: A) KABUL 57037 B) KABUL 5731 (R)

ON AFGHAN COUP

CONCERNING THE AFGHAN COUP.

2. PURPORTED TO BE WORRIED OVER EFFECT OF COUP ON REGIONAL AFFAIRS. ARE CONCERNED NOT SO MUCH WITH ANY POSSIBLE INTERNAL RUSSIAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE COUP ITSELF, BUT WITH THE POSSIBILITY THAT AFGHANISTAN WILL NOW INCLINE MORE TOWARDS RUSSIAN POLICY OBJECTIVES IN THE AREA. IN VIEW ZAHIR MONARCHY WAS BAD BUT AT LEAST IT MAINTAINED THE BALANCE, BUT NOW AFGHANISTAN MAY "TILT" MORE HEAVILY AGAINST

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PAKISTAN. [] WOULD WATCH THE SITUATION CLOSELY AS TO FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS AND WOULD BE AMONG THE FIRST TO RECOGNIZE THE NEW REGIME. []

3. AS AN INTERESTING SIDELIGHT, [] TOLD ME THAT FOR THE FIRST THREE DAYS AFTER THE COUP (JULY 17-20) HIS [] CONTACTS APPEARED VERY CONFIDENT AND SELF-SATISFIED. THEY HAD EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT DAUD WAS JUST A FIGUREHEAD AND IT WAS THE YOUNGER OFFICERS WHO HAD SPARKED THE COUP AND WERE THE KEY ELEMENTS IN RUNNING THE COUNTRY. AFTER THREE DAYS, HOWEVER, THIS ATTITUDE ABRUPTLY CHANGED AND THE RUSSIANS APPEARED TO BE SEWILDERED AS IF EVENTS HAD TAKEN A SUDDEN TURN THAT THEY HADN'T EXPECTED. SOON AFTERWARDS (JULY 28) RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR PUZANOV DEPARTED ON A SUDDEN JOURNEY TO MOSCOW WHICH [] MIGHT HAVE SOMETHING TO DO WITH THE CHANGE IN RUSSIAN ATTITUDE. =

4. AS A FINAL NOTE, [] SAID THAT HE HAD HEARD THAT THE LIBYAN DELEGATION WHICH VISITED KARUL JULY 28-29 HAD WANTED TO DEAL DIRECTLY WITH CENTRAL COMMITTEE BUT WERE TOLD THEY COULD TALK TO DAUD AND DAUD ONLY. HE DID NOT SPECULATE AS TO HOW THIS DECISION WAS MADE BUT IF TRUE IT COULD BE INDICATIVE THAT DAUD IS GAINING THE UPPER HAND IN WHAT WE HAVE BEEN GIVEN TO UNDERSTAND MAY BE AN INTERNAL POWER STRUGGLE.
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